Source - The Nation Website (Eng)
May 08, 2006

Thailand is in a dilemma when it comes to dealing with the two
great Asian powers, for historical, cultural and strategic reasons.
Discussing both India and China at the same time raises new
questions about how Thwwwwailand can work out the most beneficial foreign
policy.

Given the current focus on India's emergence on the global stage,
Thai policy-makers and business leaders have lamented not knowing enough
about India despite thousands of years of historical and cultural links
between Thailand and the subcontinent. Expectations that economic and
political relations would be entrenched by now have proven unrealistic.

Who is to blame? Thailand missed a good opportunity to hook up
with India back in the 1980s when former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi became
the first Indian leader to visit Bangkok in decades. Thailand was among the
few Southeast Asian countries at that time that recognised India's
potential. Bangkok overlooked New Delhi's diplomatic ties with
Vietnam-backed Cambodia in 1981 and proceeded to woo India. After all,
Thailand was the first Asian country to give diplomatic recognition to India
after its independence, in 1955.

Discussions by business and government leaders about Thai-India
relations often lack the power and thrust that characterise discussions of
Thai-Chinese relations. A Thai-India free trade agreement has been bogged
down. Only a handful of Thai companies have invested in India and vice
versa. Bilateral trade is still very low although the potential is there.

In China, however, Thailand's private sector is making big
strides. Charoen Pokaphand's (CP) investment in the mainland has become the
hallmark of bilateral ties. Any talk on Thai-Chinese cooperation would not
be complete without mentioning how massive and far-reaching CP's influence
in China has become.

Still, Thailand has yet to manage ties with the two Asian giants
in a holistic way. Although they have already made inroads into the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, India and China have not yet
coordinated their policies towards Asean as the groupings other dialogue
partners have done. This is good news, however. It means Asean members,
including Thailand, still have room to design their own approach to the two
powers in bilateral terms.

Thai policy-makers aim to move one step further. The central issue
is how the government can synchronise relations with India and China to
ensure mutual benefits.

Thai-India relations are the less problematic of the two because
they do not have the kind of strategic implications and challenges that
Thai-Chinese relations have often generated since the end of the Cold War.

That helps explain why Thais hope they can make the friendship with India
more unique and strategic by taking advantage of the latter's growing clout
in international and regional diplomacy, information technology and other
areas.

Thailand and India have more common interests than ever before. As
major democracies in Asia, they speak the same language. Relations with
India can advance without fear of causing consternation to other countries,
as ties with Japan often do to China.

Thais have pointed the finger at red tape and bureaucracy in
India, saying it restrains cooperation. But with India opening its economy
to foreign investment, Thailand has still been unable to fully capitalise on
India's potential.

Thai-Chinese relations cannot be discussed in isolation from other
bilateral relations, especially with the United States or Japan. Thailand is
a major non-Nato ally and has certain obligations. However Thai-Chinese
relations evolve in the near term, they will have direct policy implications
on US global strategies.

This is the key policy challenge the Thaksin government has failed
to seriously address over the past five years. Although the government has
chosen to cooperate with the US on the global campaign against terrorism, it
has failed to iron out other aspects of their relations.

On nurturing Thai-Chinese relations, Thailand's national interest
must rest on thorough considerations that are not based on personal or
corporate interests. They must encompass broad imperatives so that Thailand
can make the most from its relations with China.

Talks between Thailand and China have often focused on economic
and investment cooperation. Thailand has yet to focus on the value of a
strategic partnership with China, something China embraced when it initiated
its plan for 21st century cooperation, first with Thailand in 1989 and
subsequently with the rest of Asean.

A strategic partnership with China needs to be studied seriously
because of Thailand's strategic location and its relations with the US-led
alliance at regional and international levels. China has already forged a
series of new political and security alliances with Asean members
bilaterally and collectively.

But no Asean country really feels the pressure brought about by
these heavyweight ties as much as Thailand. In the just completed draft
Thai-Chinese plan of action, which will be approved soon by both
governments, political and security cooperation takes priority. This
includes military exercises and cooperation to fight separatism.

Interestingly, Thai policy-makers believe they can follow a policy
of accommodation with the US and China by taking up an equidistant stance.

However, neither the global nor the regional environment permits Thailand to
pursue that approach to any great result. The notion that one can have their
cake and eat it too is no longer tenable. When push comes to shove, Thailand
might have to choose sides. It can ally with either the US or China;
Thailand cannot have it both ways.
Kavi Chongkittavorn

Source: http://www.nationmultimedia.com

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